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States seek to protect their interests and territories in the 
international system. To achieve their goals, countries engage 
in what international relations theorists call deterrence: “the 
act of dissuading a targeted state from taking certain actions.” 
But states must decide what type of deterrence strategy to use 
in order to get what they want—either low-grade verbal or 
physical threats, or high-grade use of force. Using force sends a 
strong message to another state, but this action could lead to a 
costly war. In this project I considered deterrence that leads to 
stalemate to be a successful outcome, because neither country 
in confl ict has lost face but both countries have avoided war. 
Using a mixed-method approach, I analyzed all 64 cases of 
deterrence between China and Japan, India, and the United States 
from 1945 to 2015 to determine which methods of deterrence led 
to successful outcomes. The success or failure of deterrence was 
the dependent variable, while the independent variable was the 
type of deterrence employed (low-grade verbal threat, low-grade 
physical threat, or high-grade use of force). My results showed that 
in the 64 cases of deterrence between China and Japan, India, and 
the United States, 57 (89%) resulted in stalemate, or success. The 
remaining 7 cases were labeled by the COW as losses, victories, or 
retreats. In 35 of the cases, states used low-grade physical threats; 
in the remaining 29 cases, states used low-grade verbal threats 
to successfully deter another state. These results highlight the 
importance of the use of low-grade forms of deterrence between 
equally balanced nuclear states. Although employing these forms 
of deterrence may likely result in stalemate, equally balanced 
nuclear states will continue to use them to prevent the escalation of 
disputes while communicating their intent to protect their territory. 
Research advisor Meg Rincker writes: “China and Japan’s 
disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands make some observers 
fear escalation to war. Zach’s fascinating analysis shows that the 
use of low-grade threats successfully led to stalemate in 89% of 
all interactions between China and other key states. Countries 
repeat verbal threats to signal long-term commitment to not losing 
territory, rather than escalation toward violent confl ict.”
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